In Tim Dunne and Trine Flockhart (eds) (2013) Liberal World Orders. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 157-172. ISBN 9708197265529/ 9780191760334 (e-bk) For some commentators, the current world order is imperial in ways analogous to earlier explicitly imperial orders, in which the centre exercised hegemonic power over the periphery through complex legal, political, economic, and institutional relationships. This is sometimes identified as a good or necessary thing, since only an imperial order (with benign intentions) will enable the world to be made safe for liberalism. Alternatively, it is identified as a bad thing, with imperialism being defined in terms of systematic exploitation, and the claims of Poststructuralist, postcolonial, and feminist arguments all suggest that liberal world order is 1 A case famously made in the 1990s by, for instance, Chomsky (1998).
These critical accounts argue that to be a liberal subject requires a lot of work, much of which consists in inscribing and reinscribing discrimination between liberal and non-liberal or illiberal practices and subjects. This line drawing happens in different contexts and in all kinds of ways. The aim of this chapter is to explore one aspect of liberal international ordering and to examine it from the point of view of the focus on how liberal subjectivity is reproduced through line drawing in the international arena. I focus especially on the paradoxical uses of violence to sustain a world order committed to liberal values.
The chapter proceeds in three sections. In the first section, I outline what I mean by line drawing in relation to the liberal subject. In the second section, I examine the relationship between liberalism and imperialism in the work of the exemplary liberal thinker, John Stuart Mill. Mill explicitly acknowledged the dependence of liberal states on reproducing particular implementation, it becomes clear how liberal ordering is accomplished through micropractices that embed hierarchical relations of power, even as they seek to promote liberal values. In the conclusion, I return to the significance of the fact that we have yet to see a world in which the self-understanding of actors in distinctively liberal terms has not been reproduced at the expense of others. The 'win win' possibilities celebrated by classical liberal thinkers, such as Mill, translate in practice into systematically asymmetrical power relations, as liberal subjects are caught in a bind between corruption and reinvention.
<H1>Liberal subjects and line drawing</H1>
For those who read liberal world order in explicitly imperial terms, phenomena such as NATO's military humanitarian intervention in Kosovo in 1999, the invasions and occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001 and 2003 and Libya in 2011 , the articulation of the doctrine of 'responsibility to protect' (R2P), and the overall growth of UN peacekeeping, peacebuilding and state-building work in the post-Cold War period, are all evidence of ways in which liberal hegemony is imposed and maintained. But such arguments tend to concentrate on the intentions or effects of such practices at a macro level, whether to confirm their liberalism, their hypocrisy, or their effectiveness or ineffectiveness. My interest is in the micro-level ordering effects that the kinds of practices of violence mentioned above embody at the level of the reproduction of the self-identity of liberal subjects. I will argue that when we look at this dimension of practices of world ordering, our account of the relationship between liberalism and imperialism becomes complicated. It isn't possible to state straightforwardly that liberal imperialism is a liberal pathology, or that liberalism is somehow essentially imperial. Following in the footsteps of historians of the nineteenth-century British Empire, such as Catherine Hall (1992) and Karuna Mantena (2010), I suggest that the 'political entailments' of the international projection of liberalism continuously confront self-identified liberal subjects (collective and individual) with the task of demonstrating their distinction from non-liberal or illiberal others.
3 For this reason, as long as world ordering is bound up with the production and reproduction of specifically liberal subjects, this provides an ongoing basis on which deeply hierarchical practices in international legal, economic, and political relations can be legitimated. Regardless of whether the aims of these interactions are beneficent on the part of liberal subjects, they rest on asymmetrical assumptions about which parties to the encounter partake of agency and wisdom. For this reason, I will suggest, they embody volatile possibilities that can rebound on the liberal subject in unexpected ways, and often work against the explicit aim of an egalitarian transformation of the quotidian terms of engagement.
In this respect, I would argue, there is much to learn about liberal practices of world ordering from the history of the entanglement between liberal and imperial projects, which is exemplified in the work and life of Mill. Mill's liberal perfectionism offers a useful example of how the importance of liberal subjects to liberal states and liberal world order justifies a seemingly contradictory mix of ordering practices in the international realm. In addition, Mill's life demonstrates the costs, benefits, affects, and effects of the aspiration to liberal subjectivity. If his work offers us intellectual reasons for ongoing links between liberalism and imperialism, his life demonstrates the centrality of a particular form of self-identity to these links, and their unintended, and seemingly paradoxical, consequences. We will look first at Mill's arguments for national self-determination, colonialism, and imperialism, and then reflect on their implications for his account of the place of violence in a liberal world order.
Throughout, we will see how Mill's arguments and actions are permeated by presumptions about how liberal order relies on the reproduction of subjects with political agency, who combine the capacity to choose (freedom) with the capacity to discriminate (judgement).
These are line-drawing subjects par excellence.
<H1>Mill, liberalism, civilization, and corruption</H1>
Traditionally there has been a tendency to split the reading of Mill's oeuvre between different disciplines: Utilitarianism was studied in moral philosophy; On Liberty and Considerations On
Representative Government in political science; the essays on self-determination, some things were more worthwhile than others. And the way to work out which pleasures were more worthwhile was through processes of trial and error, as in the experimental method that revealed truths about the natural world. For Mill, the centrality of individual liberty as a value was due to the link between freedom and the capacity to know and pursue the good of all.
Mill makes progress, in all fields including politics, dependent on the capacity to distinguish between 'higher' and 'lower' pleasures and on the freedom to exercise that capacity independently in the ongoing search for goods that are worthwhile. Moral and political superiority, therefore, are not related to some essential list of attributes or qualities, but to capacities that manifest themselves in the activity of using freedom well. It is in this context that he is able to be a passionate proponent of individual and collective self-determination, whilst at the same time defending colonialism, imperial rule, and expressing deep concerns about the corrupting effects of mass society and majority rule. For Mill, the pursuit of truth through experimentation, necessary for maximizing the greatest happiness of the greatest number, is enabled through maximizing individual freedom, which is in turn enabled through political arrangements in which political communities are self-determining. However, this only works if individuals have the capacity to learn from the experimentation that becomes possible in conditions of liberty (Mill in Robson, 196591: 224, 11819, 122) . To give freedom to those unable to benefit from it would be pointless. This means that it is necessary to identify criteria by which to discriminate between those with the character to support a liberal domestic and international order, and those without (Ball, 2000) .
In an early work, Mill links his criteria for judging the character of individual and collective subjects to the notion of 'civilisation' (Mill in Robson, 196591: XVIII). For him, civilization has two meanings: first, it means the attainment of liberal subjectivity as identified above (normative); second, it means levels of economic and social development (descriptive). A particular state may be more civilized than others in the latter sense, but not support civilization in the former sense, but not vice versa. On Mill's account, it is not possible for 'savage' communities, with minimal wealth, cooperative relations and infrastructure to support improvement in the higher sense of the attainment of liberal subjectivity. The way to judge whether people (or peoples) were in a position to learn (civilize in the normative sense)-that is to say, to use their liberty for maximizing the good of all-was to see whether they valued liberty, and would be capable of preserving it for that greater good as opposed to using it arbitrarily or for purposes of immediate gratification. Civilization in the higher, normative sense was not a necessary consequence of civilization in the more descriptive sense, but Mill still saw the most highly economically developed state of his day (Britain) as a more fertile ground of civilization (normative) than other civilized (descriptive) states. This is evident in his support for settler colonialism by English, Welsh, and Scots (not Irish) on normative as well as descriptive civilizational grounds (Bell, 2010) .
Mill drew distinctions between those who were ready for self-government (more civilized- into the colonies on the grounds that they neither sought nor could properly benefit from liberty. Even in Britain, the advanced colonial power, Mill had persistent worries that the masses had yet to develop sufficiently for political power to be put in their hands, and that the ruling classes were collapsing into 'moral effeminacy' bred by wealth, leisure, poor education, and the lack of incentive to struggle for improvement (Levin, 2004) . It is important to note here that Mill was not an armchair political theorist, but an active politician, a member of Parliament, and with an important role in the British public sphere of his time. His earlier views on colonization were manifested in active support for colonial settlement policies and for self-government for settler colonial peoples. His arguments in favour of colonization were bound up with his dual understanding of civilization. On the one hand, he thought that colonial settlement would enable economic and social development, and on the other hand, he thought that the right kind of immigrants would also bring civilization in its higher sense, making the settler colonies laboratories for universal human improvement (Reeves, 2007; Miller, 2005) . Although colonial violence (for instance genocide in Tasmania) was part and parcel of settler colonization during the period of Mill's most enthusiastic advocacy for it, it was not something he explicitly acknowledged or discussed (Smits, 2008).
Mill's later doubts about colonialism were a response to what appeared to be a rather belated grasp of the practical effects of the self-understanding of colonial settlers. He had himself consistently argued for the superiority of these civilized communities in relation to indigenous and other peoples. But he reckoned without the effects of this self-understanding on the ways in which colonial settlers interacted with the people they displaced or over whom they ruled.
In this context it seemed that the affirmation of liberal subjectivity, the drawing of the line between truth and error, civilized and barbarian, encouraged a punitive rather than a pedagogic relation to the subordinate populations. Mill's response to what he saw as the excesses of the Governor Eyre of Jamaica (Hall, 2002) , who ordered a draconian response to civil unrest, was to move into punitive mode himself. Eyre needed to be punished because he had acted like a barbarian. In this respect, Mill affirmed his own liberal subjectivity through leading the campaign against Eyre (Hall, 1992), thus confirming in practice his capacity to draw lines in the right kind of way. At the heart of this particular example of line drawing was the capacity to distinguish and enact the difference between legitimate and illegitimate violence (Hall, 2002; Miller, 2005) .
Mill did not give up on the idea that colonialism could be a force for good, but he preserved his commitment to it through his capacity to make a double discrimination. This was expressed by on the one hand drawing a line between civilized and barbarian, and on the other by drawing a line between reasonable and barbaric uses of violence in response to challenges to colonial or imperial power. The civilizational language in which Mill articulates this double discrimination is interestingly gendered. Whereas the first dimension of discrimination situates the liberal subject as father and tutor, the latter situates him as protector and punisher. The self-evident quality of the gendered terms of Mill's discourse provides a gloss on the ways in which normative and descriptive elements in Mill's position are entangled. And they also provide a sense of self-certainty for liberal subjectivity that is lacking in Mill's more abstract accounts of liberal perfectionism. It seems that liberal subjectivity simultaneously enacts paternalistic masculinity in contrast to the feminized, childlike ignorance of the barbarian other, whilst at the same time allowing liberal subjectivity to enact chivalrous, law-governed masculinity in contrast to the hyper-masculinized barbarism of wilful error.
As explained above, for Mill, liberty is a requirement for the pursuit of the greater good, but liberty without the capacity to use it wisely is ultimately worthless. Everything therefore depends on the capacity to draw lines between civilized (those capable of using liberty well) and uncivilized (those who would transform liberty into mere consumerism or arbitrary power). The liberal subject, by definition, is one capable of judgement in the light of the greater good, on behalf of all. Mill exemplifies this, from the line he draws between the pig's happiness (lower pleasure) and that of Socrates (higher pleasure), to the one he draws between India (in need of imperial rule) and Britain (ready for genuine self-government), or the Irish (bad immigrants) and the Scots (good immigrants). But what does it mean to be a subject whose affirmation of self-identity (the capacity for judgement) is simultaneously the affirmation of superiority? At the theoretical level Mill was not dogmatic, but believed that judgements in relation to the greater good could and should be revised in the light of experience. But the very capacity to revise his judgements and redraw his lines was itself evidence of the superiority of liberal self-identity. The drawing of lines is perpetual, and it always divides up the world into truth and error, the knowledgeable and the ignorant.
In Mill's later work and political activism, he condemned colonial cruelty and recognized that it stemmed from the conviction of superiority on the part of the colonizers. But, for Mill, this confirmed rather than disturbed his view that you had to be the right kind of person, the right character, to be able to sustain liberal order. The right character was one who could understand and enact educative and punitive responsibilities towards the other (those in error) in appropriate ways (be teacher, father, protector, avenger), even when the results of enacting those responsibilities challenged liberal expectations and assumptions. Eyre had started his imperial career as a paternalistic defender of the rights of indigenous people and a fierce opponent of the whip, yet he ended it with ordering a bloodbath of hanging and flogging (Hall, 2002) . For Mill, this exemplified a corruption of character into illiberalism of the worst sort. By leading the prosecution of Eyre, Mill enacted a specifically liberal response to a crisis in liberal empire, one that reaffirmed his claim to civilization in his capacity to distinguish between justified and unjustified violence in a way that Eyre could (or did) not.
Only the liberal subject is able to determine the point at which judgement is corrupted, and only the liberal subject is one whose judgement is not either ignorant or corrupt.
Mill, the exemplary liberal subject, was faced with the continuous responsibility to draw and redraw the line between liberal and non-liberal. Paradoxically, therefore, this placed on him a continuous responsibility to confirm, through his judgements and action, his superior character in relation to others who either did not understand or wilfully rejected liberal values and institutions. The assumption of the eventual perfectibility of all subjects in Mill's thought presents constant dilemmas for the liberal subject prior to the achievement of a universal liberal condition, and in particular when other subjects prove recalcitrant in the face of the projection of liberal values and institutions. There is no substantive meaning to the nature of the liberal subject, only a capacity for discrimination that is confirmed in its own exercise as part of an ongoing project of improvement through experiment and learning. What remains constant, however, is that this process of discrimination is always involved in reproducing what liberal subjects are not. The figures of the ignorant and the wicked are essential to the learning process envisaged by Mill, and they acquire meaning for us through the gendered civilizational tropes in which they are presented to us as the catalysts and foils of progress.
<H1>Sustaining the liberal peace</H1>
In what follows I will argue that, regardless of whether one interprets the current world order in explicitly imperial terms or not, it is certainly one that is sustained by the production and reproduction of liberal subjects in Mill's sense. That is to say, by the production and reproduction of subjects with the capacity to draw hierarchical lines between themselves and those whose line-drawing capacity is either underdeveloped (feminized victim barbarians) or corrupted (masculinized perpetrator barbarians). This is evident in mechanisms for For the purposes of illustration, let us assume that a set of actors engaged in military humanitarianism in various ways are not hypocrites but are, like Mill, liberal perfectionists aiming to produce a world in which subjects are able to use freedom well. Such actors include politicians, journalists, soldiers, and humanitarian workers. In all of these cases, the one thing that cannot characterize practice or discourse, even if it may be stated to be the overall aim of the intervention, is an assumption of equality between the liberal actors and the others involved. All of these actors must represent victims as unable to help themselves, perpetrators as incapable of drawing the line between legitimate and illegitimate violence, and themselves as embodying the capacity to tell the difference between civilization and barbarism and put it to work. These representations are enacted in processes of rescue, from establishing safe havens to providing food, in many different schemes and instruments for post-conflict state building and democratization, in the killing and capture of those defined as illegitimate fighters. In each of these practices, liberal subjects meet and confirm their relation to non-liberal or illiberal others, and play out this relation in a variety of ways. These quotidian encounters spin off in several directions, producing latter-day Eyres and Mills in the process.
For example, prison guards at Abu Ghraib play out one fate of liberal subjectivity in the face of a recalcitrant population; lawyers, determining legitimate targets on the battlefield, play out another. At stake are the seemingly unavoidable, mutually exclusive alternatives of the corruption of liberal subjectivity on the one hand or its constant reinvention on the other. This is evident in the interminable drawing and redrawing of the lines that distinguish the rescuer from the rescued and from the threat in response to actual events. Killing civilians, bombing the wrong (illegitimate) targets, and the human rights abuses that have been associated with aspects of the liberal peace, rather than undermining its claims, effectively reinforce liberal self-understanding and its hierarchical relation to its others. Such phenomena, like Eyre's abusive treatment of the black population of Jamaica, provide an occasion for the reinvention of the distinctively liberal capacity to draw lines in conditions of freedom. Killing civilians is something that we minimize (as they do not). Bombing the wrong targets is regrettable but at least we recognize that there are such things as wrong (illegitimate) targets (as they do not). Abusing prisoners is wrong, but they (the abusers) are corrupt and wicked as we are not. And all of these discriminations are backed up by an array of practices and technologies: civilians are evacuated and the departure of the women and children is witnessed, lawyers advise on the legitimacy of targets, weapons are 'smart', prison guards are audited and regulated, and all those individuals involved continually encounter others in terms of the divisions that those practices institutionalize between those with the capacity to discriminate and those without.
One particularly interesting context in this regard is the context of peacekeeping and peace enforcement, which has grown massively as a responsibility of the international community over the past twenty years (Duncanson, 2009 ). On the face of it, such operations exemplify the difference between Mill's world and the current world order. Most peacekeepers on the ground are not citizens of 'advanced' liberal states, and the point of the exercise is to stop the fighting and potentially make space for longer-term solutions to ongoing conflict, not to either educate or punish the local population. Nevertheless, peacekeeping practices have been shown to reinscribe liberal subjectivity in ways that reflect Mill's gendered civilizational terms.
The purpose of peacekeeping operations is protective and preservative, not aggressive, and the individual peacekeeper therefore needs to reorient the military priorities of normal soldiering. One of the ways in which this is done is to make sense of the mission in terms of familiar oppositions between the liberal subject, victim, and perpetrator. Training for peacekeepers presents peacekeeping practice as the enactment of chivalrous masculinity, contrasted to helplessness on the one hand (women and children), and indiscriminate violence on the other (parties to the conflict). The everyday enactment of this form of military masculinity confirms the superiority of the peacekeeper and potentially legitimates a variety of hierarchical relations between peacekeepers and locals, some more benign than others.
Some peacekeeping missions have been characterized by major abuse of locals, far more have been characterized by involvement in black markets and prostitution. These dramatic and everyday corruptions have provided the occasion for the reinscription of liberal subjectivity as the capacity to discriminate, a reinscription given an interesting twist in that it is largely (though not entirely) peacekeeping troops from poor, postcolonial states who are identified as in need of discipline, whether of an educative or punitive kind. Once more the wheel identified and perpetuated by Mill is reinvented. Practices designed to improve the world have corrupting consequences that must be addressed through further practices designed to improve the world. And each time, the hierarchy between some people (usually the same ones) and others (usually the same ones) is reaffirmed.
<H1>Conclusion</H1>
Mill's perfectionism and contemporary liberal internationalism both hold out the promise of a world in which freedom is well used. In doing this, they legitimate modes of political rule and social and economic organization that will best enable the simultaneous development of freedom and wisdom. Where there is already some kind of track record of the capacity to use freedom wisely, then free markets, individual rights, collective self-determination, and democratic government are recommended. But where barbarism, through ignorance or corruption, is in place then a tutelary or punitive relation between the more and the less civilized should prevail. In terms of the ideology of liberal perfectionism, this is a passing phase, no population is essentially attached to barbarism-and universal progress is possible.
But in terms of its practice, liberal perfectionism reproduces and reinforces hierarchies even as it sets itself to overcome them. In this respect, it grounds the ongoing legitimation of inequalities of power and resources at the international level. It is difficult to find examples of liberal progress that do not simultaneously inscribe relations of superiority and inferiority between particular actors. This suggests that even if liberal world order need not be imperial, it will always be unequal, and will therefore always carry seeds of imperialism within it.
